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The enlargement of the European Union
and the consummation of the second
wave of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s expansion in the spring
of 2004 would tempt one to believe that
the postcommunist transition is coming to a close as a kind of normalcy settles over the region. Jeffrey Simon’s
careful and informative series of books
concerning civil-military relations in
four Central and Eastern European
countries reminds us that in important
respects, transition is still under way. Or
rather, given the state of civil-military
relations across the region, we should
hope that it is, for the difficulties that
postcommunist states face in democratizing, rationalizing, and strengthening
their military-security apparatuses are
still manifold. Placing Simon’s insights
against the backdrop of NATO’s own
strategic transition—the outcome of
which is very unclear—one has continuing reason to worry about the stability
of postcommunism. By extension, European security is at stake insofar as
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stability and security stem from constructive military-societal relations, sophisticated defense expertise, and well
institutionalized democratic
accountability.
In each of the three volumes, which
cover Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (now the Czech and Slovak republics) respectively, Simon provides a
detailed chronology of defense reforms
since communism’s collapse. In all
cases, Simon’s narrative is set against
four consistent criteria to which he
continually refers as he assesses the
merits and shortcomings of reform.
The four criteria revolve around:
the division of civilian authority in
democratic societies; parliamentary
oversight, especially in matters of budgeting; subordination of general staffs
to civilian institutions; and military
prestige, trustworthiness, and accountability. According to Simon’s analysis,
Poland has clearly been the best at
transforming its military-security apparatus, despite some fairly serious
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setbacks in the early 1990s. Measured in
terms of the four criteria, the Czech Republic has fared somewhat better than
its Slovak counterpart, which, after the
“velvet divorce” of 1993, found itself
building a range of military and security institutions from scratch. The biggest surprise in the series for students of
the postcommunist transition will be
how poorly Hungarian civil-military relations have developed—especially
given Hungarian politicians’ strenuous
efforts to enter the alliance.
These books are essential reading for
anyone writing on NATO, because, concerning as they do half of NATO’s newest members, the problems within these
states will no doubt have some bearing
not only on the functioning of the alliance but also on its political orientation. Certainly, there are few people
better placed to report on events and
persons crucial to the military-security
reform process than Jeffrey Simon,
given his long-standing role as a leading
American adviser to postcommunist
governments on how to advance
institutional change in this area. More
generally, those interested in the postcommunist transition and cross-national
variation would do well to spend time
trying to understand this somewhat
arcane sector’s evolution, not least because military-society relations carry
with them implications for democratic
consolidation. Admittedly, Simon does
not make this an easy or inviting task.
He has evidently been so close to the intricacies of reform that one unfamiliar
with the issues or the personnel could
conceivably drown in the detail.
Despite the particular challenges that
Simon’s intimate portrayal poses, I
would nevertheless suggest that his findings provide some puzzling questions
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for the literature on postcommunist
transition. For example, Poland and
Hungary are very often grouped together as states whose strong opposition to state socialism made them
especially susceptible to Westernizing
reform. The more repressive nature of
the Czechoslovak regime contributed to
relatively less political competition after
the transition, allowing policy errors to
endure. Although Poland’s ability to exploit NATO’s criteria for membership
in order to achieve reform confirms the
democratic opposition hypothesis,
Hungary’s relatively poor performance
in restructuring the military and accompanying political oversight raises
new questions about what provides the
impetus for reform. The military could
require explanations distinct from those
that cause variation in other kinds of
political and economic reform. On the
other hand, the logic underpinning the
democratic opposition hypothesis is
sufficiently broad that national defense
establishments should be susceptible to
Westernizing influences.
With specific respect to military-security
reforms, Simon points repeatedly in all
three volumes to problems that can
plague civil-military relations generally,
as well as to those issues that may be
peculiar to the region. The lack of civilian expertise in former Warsaw Pact
countries figures prominently in the
initial failure to formulate effective restructuring such that new lines of authority allow ministries of defense to
take on the bulk of planning and management. From lack of civilian expertise
flow other problems, including the failure to provide transparency, discipline
military malfeasance, or dedicate adequate funding to militaries in decline.
Other perennial issues have included
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the lack of acceptance of civilian control as NATO defines it—among both
military personnel and civilians, tension between general staffs and ministries of defense, and a behavioral gap
between formal institutions and lived
experience.
The news from Central Europe is, of
course, not all bad. Probably owing to
the legacy of some form of political
control dating back to the Warsaw Pact,
in combination with public enthusiasm
for communism’s collapse, none of the
militaries in question has in any serious
way attempted to interfere in the democratic transition. More often than not,
politicization of the armed forces has
been the will of errant politicians rather
than ambitious generals. On the whole,
attempts at reform have been consistent
with NATO’s objectives of improving
transparency and accountability. Parliamentary committees have gradually
gained competence over a decade and a
half and are increasingly comfortable
exercising their authority over defense
budgets. Nevertheless, in spite of the
generally positive trajectory, Central
and Eastern European states continue
to have real trouble committing the
necessary resources to reorient their capabilities toward NATO’s evolving strategic challenges, democratic political
control has not been fully established in
some instances, and, in the Czech Republic and Hungary in particular, backsliding away from initial goals has been
evident since their accession in 1999.
The massive variation over time and
across the issues under consideration
leaves one wishing that Simon had used
his vast knowledge to impose some order on the data. This is especially the
case with respect to the following two
questions: What accounts for such
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variation across countries, and what
difference has NATO made to the domestic politics and foreign policies of
Central and Eastern European countries? Although standard explanations
of postcommunist performance by
themselves generally do not explain this
variation very well, Simon’s analysis
does provide some starting points. The
combination in Poland of having had a
strong democratic opposition committed ultimately to Westernization and a
relatively high level of public respect for
the armed forces as an institution, despite the military’s past participation
in domestic repression, proved to be a
big advantage relative to the Czech Republic or Hungary. In the latter two
instances, while the existence of democratic oppositions under communism
(albeit in different forms) certainly informed transition in positive ways, the
very low standing of the armed forces
in these societies inhibited complete
reform. Slovakia is the reverse of both
variables—it has a relatively high level
of respect for the military coupled
with a political ambivalence toward
Westernization, as opposition movements in the other three countries conceived of it under state socialism.
On the second question, concerning the
extent to which NATO enlargement has
shaped domestic political reform and,
equally important for regional stability,
informed foreign policies, Simon has
remarkably little to say. This is a shame,
because someone of Simon’s stature
could be a powerful advocate for
NATO’s engagement in domestic policy
reform on the basis that the consolidation of democratic oversight, defense
budget transparency, and humane
treatment of conscripts improves the
quality of governance in postcommunist
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states. We might infer from Simon’s
books that he is skeptical of NATO’s
transformative capacity and truly does
view the evolution of civil-military relations as primarily a domestically generated phenomenon. This would be a
difficult conclusion to defend, however,
given that Simon himself points out
that NATO made the Czech-Slovak relationship much easier to manage after
the split than it otherwise would have
been. Beyond that single, very important insight, the reader is left wondering
whether the logic of NATO’s stabilizing
capacity could be extended elsewhere.
In all likelihood, NATO’s inclusiveness
has not only stabilized relations between states in Central Europe and
between Russia and former Soviet
satellites, but it also improved the quality of a range of domestic institutions
throughout the region. Speculating
about postcommunist Europe without
NATO’s engagement, one imagines a
historically vulnerable set of states with
all the domestic dysfunctions that accompany acute military insecurity. All
of the democratic adaptations that
NATO requires to improve the interface with its members and consolidate a
particular set of values would have been
the subject of protracted debate. Moreover, without NATO’s support, those
values, even in the most Westernoriented societies, might never have
prevailed. There is indeed evidence of
the contingent nature of democratic
civil-military relations in the Polish
case, where a series of crises and dissent
over the value of democratic control
delayed the subordination of the general staff to the Ministry of Defense. Although Hungary, Slovakia, and, to a
lesser extent, the Czech Republic continue to have problems in consolidating
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democratic civil-military relations, it
is worth asking where these countries
would be if NATO had never introduced the norm as a desirable and
functional feature of democratic
governance.
For those concerned with NATO’s impact on the region, Simon’s series is, of
course, an invaluable resource in understanding exactly what happened. Yet
one has to look further than Simon to
see the subtle, as well as the not-sosubtle, ways in which NATO has transformed the politics of postcommunist
Europe. Now would be a particularly
apt time for Simon to contribute to the
debate about whether NATO has salutary political effects, because as the strategic environment has worsened, the
United States in particular is manifesting less interest in the quality of democratic institutions in new member states
than in foreign policy support for wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although cultivating policy loyalty might be politically expedient, NATO could be
missing an opportunity afforded by
the transition’s political and institutional fluidity to facilitate reforms that
would not only improve the quality of
domestic governance but also help consolidate a widening democratic
community.
RACHEL EPSTEIN

Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver

Kaufman, Joyce P. NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict and the Atlantic Alliance.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
231pp. $74

4

